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Historically, exile has been a political act that has various philosophical and psychological ramifications. In the Roman world, exile was a substitute for physical death.1 Adorno argues that exile is a “life in suspension” as a result of being
placed in the diasporic conditions of estrangement. For Adorno, “it is part of
morality not to be at home in one’s home,”2 since being in exile makes one
a perpetual stranger and sharpens one’s ethical stance. The idea of being a
stranger leads to the significance of the issue of empathy. In this chapter, I discuss Shinran and Maimonides as I maintain that the focus in some of their writings demonstrates the effects of exile as “place” for empathy. I further propose
a link between empathy and ethics by viewing empathy as a measure of genuine ethical concern.
The choice of focus on Shinran and Maimonides is not predicated merely on
their being contemporaries, though divided by vast geographic distance, but is
informed by their respective statuses within their communities. In addition, by
choosing these thinkers, I aim to problematize a tendency to view Eastern and
Western thought as existing in the unrelated milieus that continue drawing the
boundaries between the familiar and the unfamiliar as impenetrable. This comparison attempts to decrease this perception.
While philosophy and consequently philosophers are often treated in terms
of “a continuation of Plato’s enterprise,” which is the life of a withdrawal from
everyday social life, viewing any thinkers and their thought outside of their
respective environments means overlooking that some of their views are directly
affected by these environments. Any thinker’s thought cannot be fully understood if it is abstracted from the history of his or her life as a whole. Rather than
viewing Shinran and Maimonides as Plato’s “cave philosophers,” we can note
that their thought demonstrates direct applicability to human lives. In the cases
of Shinran and Maimonides, their thought cannot be fully comprehended if
their respective exiles are not taken into account. In both cases, their life conditions resulted in the creation of either “hybrid” or new identities that allowed
them to view certain issues from the position of empathic insiders/outsiders.
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As a result of their displacement from their familiar environments, both
thinkers had to reinvent their own identities. The “hybrid identity” of
Maimonides was a result of his belonging to multiple communities: his own
Jewish community and the Islamic community in which he became embedded.
Shinran’s identity was reinvented as well when, following expulsion from the
monastic community, he entered the community of the common people and
broke the monastic tradition by starting his own family. For him, exile meant
being defrocked and expelled from Japan’s capital, the nation’s intellectual and
religious center, and returning to secular life. In this process of being stripped
of his ordination, Shinran’s exilic identity underwent a change as he lost his religious name and was given a new name as a layman, a name he refused to own.
For Maimonides, his new life conditions stimulated an increased emphasis
on Jewish communal life and the endorsement of the commandments (religious
law) as a means to his continual existence fully embedded and involved in the
culture of his host land. For Shinran, they meant a complete and unconditional
embrace of the teachings of the Pure Land and particularly of the practice of
the Buddha Amida.
Since Jews in Maimonides’ time never wrote their autobiographies,
Maimonides did not address his own experience. Thus, everything that is
known about him comes from his other writings and letters. Likewise, Shinran
did not leave any notes or a personal account of his experience of exile. The
influence of t heir d isplacements f rom t heir respective communities b ecomes
apparent through their writings. Their writings demonstrate that this displacement—from the Andalusian Jewish community of his childhood and youth for
Maimonides and from the monastic community of Kyoto for Shinran—produced an empathic and tolerant approach to other human beings, enhanced by
their experience of the embodied knowledge of their new surroundings and new
community members. The goal is to demonstrate that their biographical experiences, which have informed their thinking, resonate with conditions of exile
and diasporic living in pluralistic societies that define the lives of many individuals, communities, and societies in the twenty-first century. Let us briefly turn
to their respective environments before we attempt to tackle the elusiveness of
the idea of empathy.

Japanese Environment
Shinran’s life and writing fall within the Kamakura period (1185–1333), which
directly followed the Heian period (794–1185). The Kamakura period was a time
of much devastation and suffering. During this period the scholarly communities of Buddhist monks suffered a decline because their focus on the educated
elite failed to address social concerns. The first shogunate (military) government
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was established in 1192, and the Japanese warriors, rather than the court nobles,
took control of the government. In addition to many social and cultural changes,
this period was characterized by an unusual number of natural disasters, such
as typhoons, epidemics, fires, a nd earthquakes. T he K amakura period represented the crisis of the age, the so-called degenerate age (mappō), characterized
by increased distance from the teachings and practices of the Buddha.
The Pure Land tradition was a direct response to these hardships and human
uncertainties. Already enjoying some popular support among the nonelite in
the earlier Heian period, in the Kamakura period the Pure Land tradition
took a critical stance toward the decline of the preceding Buddhist traditions
into monastic formalism, sectarianism, and a focus on individual liberation.
Remaining connected to the larger Mahāyāna principles the Pure Land tradition did not negate its principle of the nondichotomous relation between
self and other. In effect, t he P ure L and t radition b ecame a n admixture of a
Mahāyāna conception of enlightened wisdom and the karmic nature of human
existence. While the traditional Buddhist view of karmic existence builds on
the principle that performing good deeds counters the negative influence of
evil deeds and hence improves conditions for rebirth, the Mahāyāna tradition,
while accepting the principle of karmic causation, maintains that bodhisattvas
perform good actions and practices and accumulate merits that become transferred to human beings. In other words, bodhisattvic practices are undertaken
with the goal of liberation of all beings.
All the teachings of the Pure Land tradition pivot around the Buddha Amida
(Skt. Amitabha), a bodhisattva Hōzō (Skt. Dharmakara) who attained the state
of Buddhahood. Making forty-eight vows, Amida Buddha established a Pure
Land as the land of happiness (Jōdo). His most important is the Eighteenth
Vow, or Primal Vow (hongan)—the vow of birth through the recitation of the
name of Amida Buddha (shōmyō nenbutsu). This vow expresses the desire to
free all beings from the weight of karmic evil. In the Pure Land tradition, the
recitation of the name of the Buddha Amida nullifies one’s k armic e vil a nd
revokes karmic causation. Hence, any human attains the potentiality of enlightenment. Shinran was particularly attracted to the nondiscriminative nature of
this tradition.

Shinran
Shinran became a Tendai monk at the age of nine and studied on Mount Hiei.
During his studies Shinran was an ordinary temple monk (dōsō), exposed to
the Tendai system’s major doctrines as well as Pure Land thoughts of such
Tendai masters as Ennin, Ryogen, and Genshin. In addition, he was influenced
by a prevalent religious consciousness in society known as the “veneration of
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Prince Shotoku.” Traditionally credited with the formal adoption of Buddhism
in Japan, Shotoku (574–622) was seen as a manifestation of the bodhisattva of
compassion, Avalokiteśvara (J. Kannon). At the age of twenty-nine, Shinran left
Mount Hiei and, after a period of spiritual turmoil, joined Hōnen and his Pure
Land movement.
Hōnen—the founder of the Jōdo, or Pure Land, school of Buddhism—
established the popular independent movement of Pure Land teaching, advocating belief in the power of Amida Buddha’s Eighteenth Vow and the recitation
of Amida’s name as the sole means for birth in the Pure Land. Hōnen’s teachings challenged the prevailing Tendai view of Pure Land thought by articulating
the nenbutsu practice as “exclusive nenbutsu” (senju nenbutsu), as an independent and self-sufficient path of Buddhist practice. Hōnen’s teaching questioned
the Tendai school’s focus on the significance of merit transfer and self-power
(jiriki). However, as his teaching of the exclusive nenbutsu spread throughout
the country, old temples at Mount Hiei and in Nara tried to prevent the further dissemination of this practice. In his teaching practices Hōnen never differentiated between monks and laypeople, men and women, or aristocrats and
common folks. This lack of differentiation was perceived as a challenge to the
traditional Buddhist institution because it ultimately ensured everyone’s access
to the sacred. Hōnen’s approach was seen as a “religious democratization.”3
Already in 1204 the priests of Mount Hiei appealed to the chief abbot to abolish the exclusive nenbutsu practice.4 As a result, Hōnen and his main disciples,
including Shinran, were exiled from Kyoto to different remote parts of Japan.
Shinran’s tenure with Hōnen was short, for he never saw Hōnen again after
being exiled.
Shinran’s period of exile fell between 1207 and 1235, during which he
lived in the harsh environment of Kokufu in the Echigo District and broke
the monastic tradition by marrying and raising a family, calling himself “neither monk nor layman.” After Shinran’s exilic ban was lifted in 1211, he chose
not to return to Kyoto and the monkhood but stayed in Echigo for two more
years. He then moved with his family to Kantō, still a somewhat rural area, perhaps benefiting from its proximity to the libraries where he began writing his
Kyōgyōshinshō (Teaching, practice, faith, and realization).
The exilic period was the most significant time in Shinran’s life in relation
to the crystallization of his thought. During this period, as he became further
disillusioned with both Buddhist institutional power and institutionalized societal power, Shinran continued self-consciously exploring human nature, with
all its passions and instincts. In his postscript to Kyōgyōshinshō, Shinran wrote:
The emperor and his ministers, acting against the dharma and violating human
rectitude, became enraged and embittered. As a result, Master Genku [Hōnen]—
the eminent founder who had enabled the true essence of the Pure Land way to
spread vigorously [in Japan]—and a number of his followers, without receiving
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any deliberation of their [alleged] crimes, were summarily sentenced to death or
were disposed of their monkhood, given [secular] names, and consigned to distant banishment. I was among the latter. Hence, I am now neither a monk nor one
in worldly life. For this reason, I have taken the term “Toku” [stubble-haired] as
my name.5 (Italics mine)

By saying he was not a monk, he divorced himself from the temporal power of
the Buddhist tradition in Japan, and by saying he was not a layperson (“nor one
in worldly life”), he distanced himself from the nobility and warriors as well.
These words clearly articulated his political views as well as his displeasure with
the lack of ethical treatment of Hōnen’s followers.
The exposure to farmers, hunters, fishermen, a nd o ther w orking p eople
made Shinran more appreciative of a nondualistic principle that did not view the
religious life and lay life as two separate realms. Shinran further reconceptualized the doctrine of merit transference. In his interpretation, merit transference
not only entailed individuals to send out their merits but could also be a manifestation of the compassion sent to others by the already enlightened Amida
Buddha. He further reinforced the idea of “other power” (tariki) by negating
the value of self-power (jiriki). This reconceptualization grew out of his own
inability to attain enlightenment by the traditional Tendai principle of accumulating merits through one’s own efforts. Becoming sensitized to the inadequacy
of one’s own efforts, he viewed self-power in terms of rational calculation (haka
rai) as merely egotistic self-focus devoid of compassion for other beings.
One of Shinran’s most important concepts is shinjin, a concept that defies
a precise translation. Its approximate translation is “entrusting faith,” and it
implies a “true, real, and sincere heart and mind.”6 For Shinran, the practice
of shōmyō nenbutsu was much less significant than attaining t he sincere m ind
(shinjin). It is sincerity and spontaneity that Shinran emphasized, not any form
of rational calculation.
Cognizant of life’s challenges and his attention to those afflicted by negative
karmic effects,7 Shinran did not use the terms “good” and “evil” to describe
people’s actions but viewed karmic “evil” as “suffering and the awareness of suffering.”8 Shinran’s early works, although lacking sophistication of Kyōgyōshinshō,
already demonstrated a humanistic focus driven by his compassion for all beings.
For instance, in Kangyo-amidakyo-shuchu (Annotated Amitayur-dhyana sutra),
composed in 1217, he cited a passage from Le-pang-wen-lei, written by Tsunghsiao in 1200, in which Tsung-hsiao discussed the rebirth of the animal slaughterer. In medieval China, by the standards of that time, the animal slaughterer
was considered unable to die a peaceful death. Shinran reflected on this story
by arguing that it is entirely possible for a butcher to be saved through Pure
Land faith. Here we can see a significant element of Shinran’s Pure Land theory, which he would call akunin-shōki (literally, the wicked person as the true
opportunity).
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The notion of akunin-shōki matured during Shinran’s period of exile, when
he became most intimately familiar with the hardships of daily labor that he
shared with his neighbors. This cognizance of human weakness and wickedness
(one’s own and that of others) led him to realize the absolute or eternal truth
of the Buddha Amida’s Eighteenth Vow, which was explicitly directed toward
those whose karmic situation made it impossible for them to reach the place of
enlightenment by their own efforts. For Shinran, that karmic situation was in
fact shared by everyone living in the degenerate age of mappō.
In a Kyōgyōshinshō chapter on faith (admittedly one of the most important
chapters in Kyōgyōshinshō), Shinran reflects and acknowledges the difficulty of
overcoming human inclinations, including a propensity for violence and greed.
Shinran refers to the Buddha’s compassion in this passage:
When there is sickness among the seven children, although the father and the
mother are concerned equally with all of them, nevertheless their hearts lean
wholly toward the sick child. Great King, it is like this with the Tathāgata. It is
not that there is no equality among all sentient beings, but his heart leans wholly
toward the person who has committed evil.9

Shinran’s work demonstrates carefully argued religious logic largely informed
by his views on human nature, including human imperfections. Human nature,
prone to weakness and wickedness, exhibits an inability to know Buddhist reality (to be reborn and hence to attain enlightenment) through one’s own efforts.
In Shinran’s thought, this inability became an equalizer among all human
beings, regardless of their wealth, social status, education, or heredity.
It would be incorrect to argue that Shinran’s reform of Buddhist practice
started only during his exile. Exile, however, helped him crystallize certain of
his contentions that resulted in some radical changes. Shinran’s own experience
of exclusion from a monastic community and his refusal to be merely a layman
either resulted in the need to reinvent his identity and increased his sensitivity
to the issues of inclusion. His firsthand familiarity of exile enlarged his awareness of the arbitrariness of judgments about good and evil and contributed to
his amplified compassion for a ll sentient beings. W hile he remained committed and devoted to his ideals, this experience further informed his thought
and his commitment to ordinary men and women. The ordinary people who
followed Shinran’s teaching were spared anxiety over salvation and continual
rebirth. This angst was alleviated with the relocation of the center of agency to
the Buddha Amida.

Jewish Environment
In Jewish tradition, God’s intentions encompass the expectation of human righteousness and ethical behavior. The question of fulfilling God’s expectation is
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directly linked to one’s religious and ethnic identity. The preservation of religious and ethnic identity arose in biblical times. The Babylonian exile demonstrated the hardships of survival in the conditions of displacement but also
demonstrated a number of factors that influenced the successful resistance to
the pressures of assimilation and preservation of one’s religious and cultural
identity.
Preservation of the Jewish tradition was affected by its history of persecution. The history of Jewish displacement influenced the need for counteracting
these adverse conditions by further strengthening ethnic and religious identity.
From the time of the loss of their native land and their separation from the central institution of the temple, Jewish survival depended on the caprice of local
rulers. Subjected to discrimination, expulsion, and massacre, the Jewish people
developed a keen sensitivity to danger. As Jews became scattered, the commandments assumed a central role in preserving Jewish existence by giving the Jewish
people norms and obligations to follow.
In medieval Muslim Spain, Jews enjoyed a period of relative peacefulness
under the rule of the Almoravids (1054–1147), a confederation of Berber tribes.
In 1125 the Almohads, rival Berber tribes who advocated the “Unity of Allah,”
rebelled against the Almoravids in the Atlas Mountains. The fighting between
these tribes lasted until 1147 and ended with the victory of the Almohads. By
the early 1150s the Almohads had conquered a wide area of North Africa as
well as the western portion of Muslim Spain, including Córdoba. By 1160 the
Almohads had expanded their control, covering vast territories that included
Tunisia and Tripoli. Ten years later the Almohads had completed their conquest of Muslim Spain. By that time the Almohads had forced conversion on
all non-Muslims, and previous protection of minority religions (dhimma status)
was lifted.

Maimonides
Moses Maimonides was born in 1138 in Córdoba, Andalusia, which was then a
major Arabic metropolis. When the Almohads conquered Córdoba, the relatively
safe Andalusian environment fell apart and Jewish lives dramatically changed.
Some information on the treatment of the Jews during this time can be gleaned
from a letter written by Maymun b. Yusuf, the father of Maimonides, in 1160:
“Overwhelmed with humiliation, blamed and despised, the seeds of captivity
surround us and we are submerged in its depth.”10 Unable to live under these
conditions, Maimonides’ family left Córdoba in 1148. As his family wandered
from place to place in Andalusia, Maimonides became an exile and a refugee at
an early age. In 1160, Maimonides and his family settled in Fez, Morocco, where
they stayed for about five years. In 1166, Maimonides and his family finally came
to Fustat (Old Cairo) after a brief stay in Alexandria.
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These wanderings from place to place influenced M aimonides’ ability to
integrate various influences and later were manifested in his intellectual versatility and testified to his “cosmopolitan” nature. Perhaps this ability was enhanced
by the fact that, even before his exile, Maimonides’ life was embedded in the
Islamic culture of Muslim Spain (Andalusia), characterized at that time by a
peaceful coexistence of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Although his ability
to adapt to a new environment was developed prior to his final exile in Egypt,
his life under Islamic dominance made him well aware of a certain inherent
duplicity.
While still wandering from Andalusia and not settled in any permanent
place, Maimonides started writing his Commentary on the Mishnah. In his conclusion to the Commentary, he wrote, “My heart is often burdened by the
troubles of the time and what God has decreed for us with regard to exile and
wandering the world from one end to another.”11 Commentary on the Mishnah
was Maimonides’ preparatory work for his Mishneh Torah (Repetition of the
Torah), his major compilation of comprehensive law code.
Maimonides’ life significantly improved when he moved to Egypt in 1166.
The Fatimid dynasty that ruled Egypt at that time was spared the Almohads’
fanaticism. In Fustat, Maimonides became integrated into Egyptian society and
involved with the day-to-day life of the Egyptian Jewish community. There
the boundary between the Jewish community and the other communities was
largely demarcated by the commandments and the requirement to adhere to
them. Maimonides did not necessarily translate this legal separation into strict
relational boundaries and did not erect any impenetrable boundaries between
his existence as a Jewish leader and an Islamic thinker.
Maimonides’ participation in public affairs demonstrated his concern with
the lives of the Jewish community. For instance, in 1169 he became actively
involved in obtaining funds for the Jewish prisoners from Bilbays who had been
captured in the Crusades. He sent letters to Jews throughout Egypt asking for
contributions to pay out ransom fees demanded by the crusaders for these prisoners. Maimonides’ commitment to his community was not limited to writing
letters and listing his name as a signatory; he also served as the campaign’s treasurer, overseeing the distribution of the obtained funds.
In 1171, Egypt was conquered by the Ayyubids, a Muslim dynasty of Kurdish
origin. Shortly after Saladin became sultan over Egypt, Maimonides was elected
the head of Egyptian Jewry—ra’is al-yahud. Navigating between Jewish and
Islamic communities, Maimonides exercised the highest judicial authority by
appointing chief judges and having broad communal responsibilities. In addition, he functioned as a respondent to legal inquiries from Jewish communities
in Egypt and elsewhere.
Given the political and institutional standing of his position, Maimonides
was thrown into a struggle with the dominant and well-established local power.
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Here we note a certain resonance with Shinran’s situation. While Shinran voiced
his objections in terms of embracing a different approach to religious practices,
Maimonides also did not always go along with the rules of the prevailing establishment. A case in point is his refusal to collect funds for the support of halakhic scholars.12 Perhaps this explains why, despite Maimonides’ integration
into the society and his role as ra’is al-yahud, he held that position for only two
years, from 1171 to 1172. He did not regain the position until later in his life,
serving from 1196 to 1204.13
In Egypt, Maimonides’ commitment to the Andalusian halakhic tradition remained firm. T his c ommitment w as t ested b etween 1 189 a nd 1 191
when Maimonides argued against some of the prevailing views held by the
Babylonian geonim—presidents of the Babylonian Talmudic Academies. A head
of the yeshiva in Baghdad, Samuel ben Eli, did all in his power to discredit
Maimonides’ rulings by ruling himself that it was permissible to sail on the
Sabbath in the Euphrates and the Tigris. A parallel can be seen in Maimonides’
commitment to those whom he considered his Andalusian “teachers” and
Shinran’s loyalty to Hōnen. In both cases, an approach chosen by these two
thinkers respectively was not in line with the prevailing view of those in power.
While Shinran directly acknowledges his debt to “seven patriarchs,”
Maimonides’ debt to his predecessors appears to be less straightforward and
depends on whether the debt is related to his halakhic works or to his philosophical writings. He acknowledges that his thought was influenced by Aristotle,
though read through the eyes of Alexander, Themistius, and Ibn Rushd (1126–
1198). He articulates his reverence for these thinkers in Eight Chapters, his
introduction to Commentary on Tractate Avot.14
Naming Aristotle (or those who explicated his writings) would have been
dangerously unprecedented, but even the reference to the “ancient and modern
philosophers” as a guide for his explanation of the commandments was already
revolutionary. Maimonides further challenges authority by adding, “Hear the
truth from whoever says it.”15 It is truth that matters, not whether it comes
from the mouth of a given sage. Holding his “teachers” in high esteem does
not translate into Maimonides’ complete agreement with their views. In analogy, but also in contrast, with Shinran—who interpreted (or in some cases
translated) the words of his “seven patriarchs” in a slightly different vein than
intended by them—Maimonides offered h is o wn o bjections t o s ome o f t he
views of the sages as well as the views of those whom he called his teachers,
highlighting his ability to think beyond what was already accepted.
Similarly to the writings of Shinran, in which he further democratized and
radicalized Hōnen’s teachings, Maimonides’ writings exhibit certain “heretical”
features. Nonetheless, even those writings, which were infused with a highly
provocative perspective, never strove to undermine but, rather, empathically
focused on ensuring the preservation of Judaism and the Jewish people.
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Like Shinran, Maimonides espoused certain opinions that contradicted
established norms. He explicitly and implicitly challenged the conventional
understanding of Judaism. Similarly to Shinran, Maimonides did not have any
institutional support that could have helped legitimize the transformations he
envisioned. Neither did Maimonides claim any divine inspiration, nor, contrary
to Shinran, did he back up his claim by referring to the thinkers before him. In
his introduction to the third part of his philosophical magnum opus entitled
The Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides writes: “I followed conjecture and supposition; no divine revelation has come to me to teach me that the intention
in the matter in question was such and such, nor did I receive what I believe in
these matters from a teacher.”16
Maimonides’ possession of a heretical streak should not be mistaken for an
intention to undermine the centrality and the significance of t he commandments. While he recognized that complete adherence at times might not be
feasible, he considered following the commandments as being imperative to
preserving Jewish heritage. The possible inability for a complete devotion to
the commandments necessitated certain creative reinterpretations. Maimonides
was acutely aware of the contradictions and stipulations that originated from
the conditions of exilic life. His Mishneh Torah was, in effect, an instrument of
sustainability of one’s existence in exile. By contextualizing specificity of t he
conditions and putting Mishneh Torah into language accessible to everyone, he
converted it into a mechanism central to the construction of a viable diaspora.
Maimonides transformed the Talmudic elliptic style, with its variety of overlapping arguments, into comprehensible material and a functional tool for continual survival.
Maimonides’ approach to intolerable conditions and imposed conversion
can be gleaned from some of his direct thoughts in his “Letter on Forced
Conversions” (Iggeret ha-Shemad).17 In this letter he privileges human life and
states that the only clear case in which the Jew should die rather than transgress
is when he or she is under condition of being forced to violate the commandments that prohibit idolatry, adultery, and murder. Maimonides asserts that, in
other cases, the Jew must take into account the purpose for which the transgression is being forced upon him or her and whether the transgression will occur
in private or in public. Maimonides makes a clear distinction between the matters of the heart (inner feelings) and outer exhibitions (any actions that one is
required to perform in order to survive). He exhibits a high sense of tolerance
when he advises Jews to confess the Islamic creed rather than die. Yet when Jews
are forced to transgress, they should do it to the smallest extent possible and aim
to leave that place as soon as it becomes possible.
In this letter Maimonides combines an allowance for compromise (to ensure
survival) with an argument against complacency. Despite his empathic approach,
Maimonides transcends the immediacy of suffering and provides a nuanced
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perspective. Typical of his style, Maimonides does not aim to offer clear guidelines for acting under duress; on the one hand, he shows leniency; on the other,
he encourages Jews not to stay in the environment that is conducive to coercion.
He combines his love for the Jewish people and anxiety for their personal safety
with his concern for the Jewish community’s continual existence.
Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen, written in 1172, is a further testimony to
his commitment to the Jewish community. He concludes this epistle by noting
that despite having concerns about his own safety after making his views public, he is convinced that “the public welfare takes precedence over one’s personal
safety.”18 Maimonides’ diasporic personality is that of a person who shared the
fate of those to whom he addressed his writings, which provides him with language that speaks directly to his audience.
Throughout his life in Egypt, Maimonides always considered himself an
Andalusian. despite being displaced from Andalusia. His life in exile, as his
writings demonstrate, was dedicated to preserving Judaism, to “save the Jewish
world from the halakhic and spiritual ruin he had experienced.19 His goal, however, was never to claim the impossibility of coexistence with other traditions;
rather, he believed in that coexistence with the distinct particularities remaining intact.

Empathy
Recalling that I suggested that exile is conducive to the increased ability for
empathy, I turn now to empathy as an important concept in relation to our
capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people’s minds. It also has
been seen as important in relation to our faculty to identify with others and
to respond to them in an ethically appropriate way. I focus here on empathy as
understood by Edith Stein (1891–1942), a student of Edmund Husserl (1859–
1938). In her 1916 doctorate on empathy, Stein addressed not only what empathy means but also its problematic character. While she follows Husserl that
empathy is “the basis of intersubjective experience” and “the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world,” she emphasizes the embodiment
of empathy by pointing out “the expressive dimensions of bodily movement and
of speech.”20 Stein argues that empathy is “the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of the experiencing subject or of the
subject whose consciousness is experienced.”21 In her view, empathy is a shift
of intentional focus to the recipient’s viewpoint without loss of self-awareness.
Emphasizing the intersubjective and relational dimensions of empathy allows
one to understand others but also to increase one’s self-understanding.
In some cases, empathy becomes affected by emotional contagion or emotional infection. Precisely because there is the danger of confusing empathy
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with emotional contagion or emotional infection, it is important to keep in
mind the significance of the differentiation between self and other. Emotional
contagion is a process that is relatively unreflective, unintentional, and hence
largely inaccessible to one’s awareness. It is usually driven by a self-oriented
perspective and results in one’s assessing the other according to one’s own perceptions. A self-oriented perspective errs on the side of misrecognizing that in
actuality one’s own response to a set of circumstances is rarely an indication of
another’s reaction. In actuality, self-oriented perspective leads to personal distress when, by seeing everything as related to self, one loses track of the fact that
the experience is actually someone else’s, not one’s own. Empathic distress in
effect nullifies empathy to the other because all attention becomes focused on
the self, and the focus is now placed on the means to alleviate one’s own pain
and discomfort.
Because of its self-oriented perspective, empathy is more likely to extend to
kin group members than to strangers from another land or tribe. Being in exile
limits this self-oriented perspective because, as Adorno expressed, exilic conditions are characterized as “an incomprehensible” and one might be less tempted
to project one’s own experience as universally applicable to everyone.
In her discussion of empathy, Stein differentiates between our experience
of our own pain as a primordial, or firsthand, experience and our experience
of another’s pain as nonprimordial, or secondhand, experience. However, she
argues that the awareness of the pain of others is primordial for us. For Stein,
empathy is an “embodied experience” rather than merely abstract or theoretical.
I suggest that exile provides the embodied experience conducive to an enhanced
sense of empathy.
In her later works, Stein posits that individual consciousness can be understood only as a result of external impacts and influences, and she places much
more emphasis on the importance and impacts of one’s community.22 She develops an account of social acts as “a third form of social relation” in which social
acts are intermediary between empathy and collective intentionality. Mutual
communication among human beings is the means of establishing communities that are characterized by the integration of the individuals on the basis of
the cognitive, the intentional, the normative, and the phenomenological dimensions. These dimensions cannot be considered in isolation from each other
but, rather, must be considered in relation to one another. According to
Stein, humanity is “one great individual,”23 and community its best
representation.
I suggest that exile further sensitizes one’s sense of empathy to extend
beyond the familiar without reducing the identification with the members of
one’s own group. From a Buddhist viewpoint, however, empathy might be a
natural state of being with others. If we take into account the Buddhist concept of interrelatedness, we recognize that each self is embedded in a sharing
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meaning with others. In this case, exile reinforces the sense of empathy by
bringing an increased awareness of life’s travails.
What is the relation between empathy and ethics? According to Hume, our
empathic feelings toward someone affect our judgment of one’s actions a nd
provoke our desire for justice. Empathy is instrumental for the development of
our capacity to make moral judgments by increasing our sensitivity to moral
rules and the ideals of justice. Exile can be a means of familiarizing oneself with
diverse and distant cultural and religious groups and developing “a broader
and more consistent capacity to empathize.”24 Invoking Adorno again, I recall
his words that “it is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home,”25 and
exile certainly increases the likelihood of not being “at home in one’s home.”
Empathy is a measure of genuine ethical concern. However, empathy is not a
condition for ethical response but a possibility for it. In other words, empathy
increases potentiality for an ethical involvement. This ethical involvement in the
case of Shinran and Maimonides may be observed through some of the themes
addressed in their writings.
Michael Slote argues that empathy provides the “cement of the moral universe” and foregrounds moral approval.26 Reflecting on the notion that empathy
can be a means of moral approval, we should not go so far as to suggest that the
writings of Shinran and Maimonides exhibit moral approval; rather, they exhibit
the absence of moral disapproval. Their respective exilic conditions enabled
them to distinguish between self and other without assessing this distinction
in any moralistic terms. For Shinran this is observed in his conceptualization of
akunin-shōki, whereas for Maimonides it is exemplified in his articulation of the
approach to conversion. In addition, their need to reinvent their own identities
resulted in an empathic understanding of the complexity of the identities and
ethical needs of others.
With this in mind, I suggest that Shinran’s and Maimonides’ writings demonstrate that exile heightened their sense of empathy and as a result further sensitized their respective approaches to ethics. Their writings implicitly exhibit the
key components of empathy, and their approach intertwines affect and cognition rather than building only on either one of these components of empathy.
As Lawrence Hatab has observed, empathy is “a mode of disclosure that generates ethical import.”27 For Shinran and Maimonides, this mode of disclosure
is in their writings.
Empathy is one of the significant concepts t hat s erved b oth Shinran a nd
Maimonides as a means for their empathic identification w ith t heir n ewly
acquired communities. Some of Maimonides’ writings demonstrate that a sense
of empathy is his ability, in Stein’s terms, to “enter the foreign consciousness”
affected by his own experience of displacement. That ability, while enhanced by
his sense of duty to his own community, is intensified also by his appreciation

6859_Book_V3.indd 283

2/25/19 8:23 AM

284

Ilana Maymind

and respect for the other. Like Maimonides’ writings, Shinran’s teachings are
testimony to his own empathy.

Exile as “Place” for Empathy
Despite their differences, Shinran’s a nd M aimonides’ tolerance a nd empathy
arose, not only from their intellectual musings, but also from their need to contend with these issues personally. It is their respective exiles that provided them
with a “place” for empathy but also allowed them to show resolve rather than
capitulation of their values and to challenge a perception of powerlessness and
fearfulness often associated with those who are placed in adverse or unfamiliar
conditions. In some instances, their capacity for empathy enhanced their ability to compromise without sacrificing their values. Their respective conditions
of exile allowed them to develop empathic feelings, not only toward the people
who shared their immediate experiences or to the members of their own community, but also toward the people who shared the experiences of life’s hardships. To say that their experience of exile attuned their sense of empathy only
for those who were like them is to limit empathy to empathy contagion and to
see them as exercising a self-oriented perspective. The idea of emotional identification cannot be reduced to the narrowly conceived similarity in one’s experience. Emotional identification in their case reflects their nuanced approach to
what can be considered morally acceptable.
However, we should not reduce their approaches to mere similarities, and
we should be careful not to overlook differences that inform their views. Their
focus on empathy for human beings carries differing u ndertones. S hinran,
driven by a sense of compassion that became heightened by his exilic conditions, advanced teachings that included acceptance of the disenfranchised and
the disadvantaged. He emphasized overcoming life’s problems from within oneself, viewing the world of mappō as fundamentally “unsaveable.” This approach
remains within the parameters of traditional Buddhism.
Shinran’s focus on the individual rather than on social transformation contrasts with Maimonides’ approach. Maimonides stressed the communal, social,
and political commitments related to the covenantal (obligatory and promissory) relationships that typify Judaism. To claim, however, that Maimonides
was concerned with the survival of the community at the expense of the individual would be incorrect. His emphasis on the commandments as the underlying ethical system testifies to his commitment to Judaism but also to his concern
for the community’s preservation. Yet, out of his sense of empathy, he is capable of taking into account any extenuating circumstances that might require an
adjusted approach.
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Exile heightened Maimonides’ sense of empathy, coupled with his concern
for justice and ethics. As a leader of the Jewish community and a liaison between
that community and the Muslim rulers, Maimonides was acutely aware of the
intricacies involved in this setting. Despite his ability to learn from and appreciate an unfamiliar environment, his own experience of exile made him intensely
mindful of the dangers of being swallowed by a surrounding alien culture, and
it strengthened his aspirations for the preservation of the community and its traditions. In some cases his ideas involved disagreement with other members of
the Jewish community, but more often than not those ideas encompassed critical awareness of the dangers of outside forces.
While Shinran was not embedded in a similarly complex and conflictual
environment that required balancing between different cultural and religious
systems of thought, his firsthand experience of being exposed to the corruption
of the ruling powers (shogunate) and also to the complacency of the monastic community similarly augmented his sense of ethical compassion. His exposure to his own culture’s inadequacies heightened his empathy for ordinary
folks whose lives were directly affected by these failings. Although he was not
faced with the loss of Buddhism per se (contrary to Maimonides’ concern that
Judaism might become absorbed into Islam), he was critical of the prevailing
Tendai system of thought and was convinced that the True Pure Land tradition
was more inclusive and accepting of all beings. At the core of the thought of
these two men was a similar concern with the well-being of humans.
Shinran’s exile, unlike that of Maimonides, did not result in aspirations
and concerns of retaining a distinct theological community but pointed to his
hope of transforming and democratizing the prevailing Tendai tradition. If
viewed superficially, his take on adherence to a tradition can seem diametrically
opposed to that of Maimonides. Yet this is not completely accurate, because
Shinran aimed not to get rid of the Tendai tradition, which in itself incorporated some ideas of Pure Land thoughts, but to further strengthen this thought
within the existing tradition by challenging its status quo. His implicit desire to
transform the tradition does resemble Maimonides’ service to his coreligionists
when he is similarly willing to challenge the existing state of affairs. However,
it would be misleading to claim that his concerns for his fellow human beings
included a direct call for any reformation of the political structure, which is
absent in Maimonides’ thought as well. Like Maimonides, Shinran was personally aware of the political repercussions of challenging the prevailing religious
system. An expectation for ethical treatment was inherently linked to concern
for inclusion but also to concerns for safety and the provision of unthreatening
and humane conditions.
The thought of Shinran and Maimonides, two exceptional men who, even in
conditions of adversity, were capable of focusing on larger concerns for others,
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reminds us that empathy and tolerance are notions that will never become obsolete. The cultivation of these qualities will always be imperative to humanity’s
well-being. Exile teaches us to look empathically beyond our own group by
warning us that “within an embrace of particularity lies the danger of tribalism,
where a myopic fixation on one’s own group can obscure or cancel out the dignity and humanity of other groups.”28 This is not to say that one’s cultural and
religious heritage is to be forsaken and replaced but to say that one’s culture has
a finite presence capable of accepting other cultures. Shinran and Maimonides
in their exile were directly exposed to the other, which taught them empathy
and acceptance of difference.
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